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Compliance with Non-Binding Norms of 
Trade and Finance 
DAVID A. WIRTH 
The studies collected in this chapter are emblematic of the wider universe of 
non-binding instruments, illustrating the flexibility in substantive content and 
procedural context that is a principal hallmark of non-binding undertakings. 
Taken as a group, the studies reveal cleavages characteristic of the legal and 
policy dynamics surrounding non-binding instruments, as they vary in: (l) 
choice of non-binding rather than binding format; (2) institutional setting; (3) 
relationship to binding international law; (4) identity of norm-creating enti-
ties; (5) identity of parties addressed; (6) processes for adoption and imple-
mentation; (7) impact on domestic policy and law: and (8) the role of the 
public in norm formulation, implementation, and compliance. 
Beth Simmons' analysis highlights many attributes of a 'classical' or 'tradi-
tional' non-binding vehicle, to the extent such a model can be identified 
among the extraordinarily diverse examples assembled in this volume. Her 
study consequently is useful as a benchmark, providing a reference point 
against which the others can be compared. The Forty Recommendations of 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) are a policy response to an arche-
typal collective action problem: how to overcome the incentives inherent in 
the decentralized and consent-based international system, which often 
rewards holdouts, scofflaws, free riders, and laggards. As described by 
Professor Simmons, the efforts of the United States to encourage or, indeed, 
leverage higher standards of performance on the part of other states-to 'har-
monize up' -was a principal motivating factor explaining the nature of the 
FATF's activities generally and the Forty Recommendations in particular. 
Professor Simmons identifies characteristics frequently cited as benefits of 
a non-binding approach, which might be described as the 'choice of instru-
ment' question. The commitment of states other than the United States is 
described as tentative or equivocal. In such a context, states might commit to 
binding obligations only of a modest character, if at all, while a non-binding 
'soft' instrument can allow them to gain experience with more ambitious, 
aspirational goals in a less risky milieu. non-binding instruments also may be 
appropriate for circumstances in which consensus is elusive or illusory. Thus, 
they may be attractive alternatives to an inertial downward spiral towards the 
'least common denominator' characteristic of many multilateral efforts. For 
these reasons, among others, non-binding instruments are often phrased, as 
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are the Forty Recommendations, in hortatory 'shoulds' rather than obliga-
tory 'shalls'. Perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, a non-binding format charac-
terized by a sense that less is at stake in a legal sense may also facilitate more 
vigorous compliance mechanisms than might be expected in a binding inter-
national agreement. The F ATF's mutual evaluation mechanism described by 
Professor Simmons clearly falls into this category. The monitoring process 
accompanying the Forty Recommendations capitalizes on the non-binding 
format's flexibility, facilitating transparency as to the activities of participat-
ing states, helping to ensure compliance, and allowing elaboration of general 
principles for particular situations. 
The Forty Recommendations, while adopted by states, also are addressed 
directly to private actors, primarily financial institutions. The character and 
status of non-state actors makes the binding international agreement a con-
siderably less-well suited form of regulatory instrument. In formal terms, 
treaties and other international agreements are concluded only among states 
or other subjects of international law, not with or among private actors. 
Acting as desirable or necessary intermediaries, states parties to a treaty may 
undertake to regulate the behavior of private actors within their jurisdiction. 
In the area of trade and finance, where the private sector predominates and 
is the primary targets of norms, non-binding instruments, despite their 
nonbinding character, become appealing vehicles through which states can 
establish expectations. The latter are often phrased as 'good practice stan-
dards' and are transmitted directly to nonstate actors without the necessity 
for government regulatory action. 
The ease of amendment identified by Professor Simmons is another advan-
tage frequently attributed to a non-binding format. The Forty Recommenda-
tions were adopted originally in 1990 and 'revised in 1996 to reflect changes 
in money laundering trends', 1 apparently with a minimum of procedural 
complexity. The use of the nontechnical description 'revised' is telling, as the 
analogue in treaty practice would be an amendment to a binding multilateral 
agreement. Under customary international law, an amendment to a multilat-
eral treaty is in effect a new agreement, binding only those states that indicate 
their affirmative intent to accept the new obligations. 2 States ordinarily 
1 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Annual Report 1997-1998, O.E.C.D. 
Doc. FA TF-IX 6 (June 1998) ( <http://www.oecd.org//news_and_events/release/FA TF98. 
PDF>). The 1996 revision of the Recommendations can be found at Financial Action Task 
Force on Money Laundering, Annual Report 1995-1996, Annex I (June 28, 1996) 
(<http://www.oecd.org//fatf/pdf/96ar-e. pdf> ). 
2 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, Art. 40, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
reprinted in (1969) 8 I.L.M. 679. The Vienna Convention is ordinarily considered a codification 
of most customary international law concerning treaties. For example, this instrument, although 
not in force for the United States, has been accepted there as an authoritative source regarding 
,the customary law of international agreements. See S. Exec. Doc. L, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. I (1971 ); 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States pt. Ill, introductory note 
(1987): 
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indicate their assent to an amendment through the often time-consuming and 
cumbersome processes of signature, ratification, and acceptance.3 One obvi-
ous consequence of this rule is the potential to create classes of parties with 
different obligations, an undesirable situation in multilateral surroundings 
whose principal purpose is to encourage concerted action by states. 
Another aspect of Professor Simmons's subject that makes it a typical non-
binding initiative is the 'choice of forum', the fact that the efforts were under-
taken in connection with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). The decision to treat the subject matter of money 
laundering in this institutional setting appears far from coincidental. One 
senses that the OECD, often described as a 'club' of wealthy developed mar-
ket-oriented economies, was a desirable venue precisely because of its limited 
membership oflike-minded states characterized by a sense of shared outlook 
and purpose. In such a framework, the identification of common goals may 
well be easier than in an organization with universal membership, such as a 
specialized agency or program of the United Nations. As a corollary to this 
principle, once a grouping such as the OECD has overcome the impediments 
to joint action among its own members, it is in a position to exert significantly 
enhanced leverage over outsiders. Professor Simmons' description of the 
treatment of nonmembers by the FA TF is a classic example of this phenom-
enon. 
The OECD's constituent multilateral treaty anticipates the adoption of 
non-binding recommendations and binding decisions.4 The FATF instead 
started as an OECD 'project' but subsequently evolved into an ad hoc non-
binding undertaking involving OECD members and nonmembers. As 
described by Professor Simmons, the FA TF now has its own secretariat specif-
ically crafted to meet the substantive and institutional demands presented by 
the subject matter and identified by the participating states. The Forty 
Recommendations do not have the character of, and arguably have less bind-
ing force than, formal recommendations within the meaning of the OECD 
treaty. But as Professor Simmons points out, such legal distinctions are largely 
irrelevant to the efficacy of the F ATF's work, which is more determined by the 
participating states' collective political will than by the niceties of legal form. 
3 A particular agreement may specify another procedure. E.g., Montreal Protocol on 
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, September 16, 1987, art. 2, para. 9, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 10, 100th Cong., !st Sess. (1987), reprinted in (1987) 26 I.L.M. 1550, adjusted and amended, 
June 29, 1990, S. Treaty Doc. No. 4, 102d Cong., !st Sess. (1991), reprinted in (1991) 30 I.L.M. 
539, adjusted and amended, November 25, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 9, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1993), reprinted in (1993) 32 l.L.M. 875 (adjustments binding on all parties adopted by two-
thirds majority of parties to parent instrument). 
4 Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, December 
14, 1960, art. 5, paras. (a) and (b), 12 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. No. 4891, 888 U.N.T.S. 179. See, e.g., 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD and the Environment (1986) 
(collecting OECD decisions and recommendations on environment). 
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The F ATF's work, like many non-binding efforts, is embedded in a com-
plex web of binding agreements, such as the Vienna Convention Against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and other non-
binding instruments and initiatives. The F ATF thus performs another oft-
cited function of non-binding initiatives: filling gaps and holes in binding 
regimes. The less formal venue of the FA TF provides an alternative channel 
for treating money laundering against a background of few ratifications of 
the binding Vienna Convention. 
Read against the baseline of the FATF study, Laurence Boisson de 
Chazournes' analysis of the World Bank's policies is a useful study in con-
trasts. Perhaps most obviously, where the FATF's Forty Recommendations 
identify a specific subject matter characterized by relatively straightforward 
problems and goals, the World Bank's operational policies are a quite con-
scious attempt to integrate and balance competing themes in the Bank's func-
tional mission, which historically has been defined primarily in economic 
terms. Until roughly a decade ago, the Bank was resistant to incorporating 
social welfare concerns such as human rights, environment, the interests of 
indigenous peoples, and labor standards5 into its work. In the FA TF a non-
binding approach is employed directly to advance readily identifiable policy 
goals through an ad hoc, freestanding structure. The Bank's operational poli-
cies described by Professor Boisson de Chazournes are intended instead to 
encourage the penetration of exogenous social policy factors into the opera-
tions of an existing international institution by modulating, regulating, and 
constraining what might be described as the natural institutional momentum 
of the Bank. 
The situation described by Professor Boisson de Chazournes is not set out 
in the World Bank's constituent treaties, 6 but instead has been crafted in a less 
formal context to occupy interstices in the Bank's institutional structure. No 
explicit provision in the Bank's constitutional instruments governs the 
generic sort of policies that guide the Bank's discretion in approving particu-
lar proposals for loans and credits, nor is there any indication of a procedure 
by which those instruments can or must be adopted. Likewise, there is no 
express legal authorization for the Inspection Panel, which was created by 
resolution of the Bank's Board of Executive Directors.7 To that extent, these 
5 See e.g., (1988) 82 Proc. Am. Soc'y Int'/ L. 41, 42 (remarks of Ibrahim Shihata, Vice 
President and General Counsel, World Bank, noting that '[i]n the case of the World Bank, its 
Articles of Agreement entrust the organization with specific functions and responsibilities-all of 
them related to economic growth, reconstruction, and development'). 
6 See Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association, January 26, 1960, 
11 U.S.T. 2284, T.I.A.S. No. 4607, 439 U.N.T.S. 249; Articles of Agreement of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, December 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S. No. 
1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, amended August 25, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 1942, T.I.A.S. No. 5929. 
7 See I.B.R.D. Res. No. 93-10; LO.A. Res. No. 93-6 (September 22, 1993), reprinted in (1995) 
341.L.M. 503. See generally Shihata, I.F.I., The World Bank Inspection Panel (1994). 
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vehicles can be viewed as performing a gap-filling function similar to that of 
the Forty Recommendations. The analogy is limited, however, because in the 
World Bank the lacunae arise in the structural framework of an existing inter-
national institution with a continuing operational mission; the interstices in 
the international system occupied by the FATF, given the existence of area-
sonably comprehensive binding instrument, are instead more plausibly 
described as ones of political will expressed as the failure of targeted states to 
ratify and implement the agreements. 
That the World Bank's constituent treaties do not expressly anticipate an 
approach of the kind described by Professor Boisson de Chazournes does not 
suggest that such a strategy is necessarily ineffective. On the contrary, the 
Inspection Panel is the first instance in which any multilateral institution has 
submitted the question of the adequacy of its own operations to external 
review. At least in principle, the interlocking system of the Bank's operational 
standards and its Inspection Panel provides a comprehensive structure for 
application and implementation of a system of good practice standards in the 
Bank's day-to-day work. Indeed, given the Bank's institutional structure and 
the opportunities in the project cycle at which internal decision making might 
be amenable to external input, it would be difficult to identify a different or a 
better approach. 
The World Bank study presents an interesting permutation on the catego-
rization of non-binding or 'soft' norms and binding or 'hard' law, and of the 
relationship between them. First, it would probably be a mistake to charac-
terize the Bank's operational standards as 'soft' or non-binding as a categor-
ical matter. As Professor Boisson de Chazournes points out, certain 
categories of these instruments, including the Bank's 'Good Practices', are no 
more than precatory by their own terms. Others, such as the new 'Operational 
Policies' and 'Bank Procedures', are more often phrased in obligatory lan-
guage. The Bank staff clearly views the application of the latter instruments 
as nondiscretionary and private parties can enforce the policies and proce-
dures through the mechanism of the Inspection Panel. 
The Bank's operational standards, whether mandatory or discretionary, 
apply to the institution's professional staff, not to borrowing countries, and 
consequently cannot bind the latter as a formal matter. World Bank loan 
agreements, however, have a status in international law similar to that of 
binding treaties8 and are enforceable by the Bank against the borrower. To 
the extent that the covenants in the loan agreement explicitly or implicitly 
incorporate the Bank's operational standards, those standards become trans-
formed or 'hardened' into binding legal obligations. While the Inspection 
Panel mechanism as a formal matter does not apply to allegations made 
8 See Nurick, L., 'Certain Aspects of the Law and Practice of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development', in Stephen M. Schwebel (Ed.), The Effectiveness of 
International Decisions (1971) I 00, 127 (statement by World Bank Deputy General Counsel). 
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against borrowing country governments directly, through that channel pri-
vate parties can scrutinize the adequacy of Bank staff's performance at two 
major junctures: (1) in the design and appraisal of individual loans; and (2) in 
Bank staff's oversight of borrowers' contractual obligations. The Bank's 
internal standards are relevant and, at least when phrased in those terms, 
binding in both these settings. Consequently, although not formally binding 
on borrowing country governments, the Bank's operational standards are 
likely to have significant legal and practical implications for borrowers, both 
internationally and domestically. 
A revealing dynamic arises in the application of standards external to the 
Bank in the design and appraisal of loans. As noted by Professor Boisson de 
Chazournes, the Bank makes use of a number of non-binding normative 
instruments of external origin, such as the F AO Code of Conduct on the 
Distribution and Use of Pesticides, in its operations. The good practice stan-
dards contained in such instruments may inform or be incorporated by refer-
ence in internal policies, such as the Bank's Operational Policy on Pest 
Management, which expressly cites the F AO Code. References such as this to 
external standards may perform a useful legitimating function within the 
Bank, while legally, through a process similar to that characteristic of the 
Bank's internal standards, these advisory instruments may be transformed 
into binding loan covenants. 
The Bank's policies specify that the institution 'will not finance projects 
that contravene an international environmental agreement to which the mem-
ber country concerned [i.e., borrowing country] is a party'.9 In other words, in 
the case of binding obligations the Bank will insist that borrowers comply 
only with those they have already undertaken, at least in the environmental 
field. This limitation presumably is motivated by a recognition that, unlike 
non-binding instruments, international agreements have identifiable parties 
and that the borrower concerned should not be held to obligations it has 
shown itself unwilling to accept. 
It is clear that this reluctance to rely on multilateral agreements to which a 
borrower is not party as a standard of good practice arises from policy sensi-
tivities and not legal impediments. The key factor distinguishing a loan agree-
ment with the Bank from an unratified multilateral agreement is that in every 
instance the consent of the borrowing country government to the terms of a 
loan agreement with the Bank is a necessary condition precedent to the 
conclusion of that agreement. If the borrower agrees to the terms on which 
the loan is offered, then the loan agreement with the Bank operates per se as 
a consensual derogation of sovereignty that is no different from any other 
international agreement to which the borrowing country is party. If, on the 
9 World Bank Operational Manual Statement No. 2.36: Environmental Aspects of Bank 
Work 9(e) (May 1984), reprinted in Shihata, supra note 7, at 137 (emphasis supplied). 
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other hand, the borrower rejects the terms proposed by the Bank, there are no 
international legal consequences because the borrower has no right to the 
loan and has voluntarily declined to enter into the agreement. 
The principle as stated in the Bank's policy, moreover, is belied by the insti-
tution's own practice. Barber Conable, President of the Bank at the time of 
the adoption of the Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes, is reported to have directed Bank staff to refrain from 
financing projects involving international shipments of toxic detritus. 10 The 
Bank's policy thus appears to be more stringent than the obligations con-
tained in the relevant international instrument. While borrowers may not 
appreciate such an approach, the Bank has both the authority and responsi-
bility to determine loan conditionality according to its own standards, 
regardless of whether those policies arise strictly from within the institution 
or are informed by 'soft' or 'hard' sources of external origin. Additionally, 
promoting wider ratification of multilateral environmental agreements is 
both a desirable and a legitimate element of the Bank's operational mandate. 
The Bank's practice is less clear about customary international law. The 
Bank 'will not finance projects that could significantly harm the environment 
of a neighboring country without the consent of that country' .11 This require-
ment closely tracks a customary standard prohibiting transboundary pollu-
tion as found, for instance, in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration. 
Otherwise, customary international legal standards do not appear to operate 
as a constraint on the Bank's operations, either as a matter of principle or of 
practice. On the other hand, the Bank's policy on international waterways 
mirrors customary norms in this area, presumably as a policy consideration 
not compelled by international law, as least from the Bank's point of view. 
The resolution creating the Inspection Panel contains some potentially sig-
nificant limitations on its authority that are of particular interest in the 
instant context. The Panel, pursuant to the resolution creating it, is confined 
to considering 'a failure of the Bank to follow its operational policies and pro-
cedures with respect to the design, appraisal and/or implementation of a pro-
ject financed by the Bank'. The Bank's 'operational policies and procedures' 
referred to in the resolution creating the panel do not necessarily reflect bind-
ing customary norms even in such areas as human rights, let alone the good 
practice standards contained in non-binding multilateral instruments. Just as 
there is no legal impediment to reliance on non-binding instruments or 
treaties to which the borrower is not a party in crafting loan conditions and 
covenants, there is similarly no legal reason why Bank policies and practices 
10 S_ee, ,e.g., Land, T., 'Managing Toxic Waste: International Regulation of Hazardous Waste 
Matenals, The New Leader, November 27, 1989, at 4 (available in Lexis, News file) ('the World 
Bank_· · · has announced that it will refuse to finance any development project and [sic] involves 
the disposal of another country's toxic waste') 
11 World Bank Operational Manual State1;ent No. 2.36, supra note 9. 9(0. 
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cannot incorporate customary norms, subsequently to be enforced through 
the Inspection Panel process. 
In the case of customary legal obligations, there is a compelling argument 
precisely to the contrary. As a public, multilateral, intergovernmental orga-
nization, the Bank is considerably more than just an agent of borrowing 
country governments. Instead, the Bank, whose membership is now nearly 
universal, is accountable to the international community as a whole and is 
consequently under an obligation not to act inconsistently with international 
law. In other words, the Bank's Articles of Agreement ought to be read in 
light of customary international law binding on the Bank's member states and 
the Bank itself as subjects of public international law. 12 One might well argue 
that international law precludes the Panel from taking action contrary to cus-
tomary norms and that the Inspection Panel would be a natural forum for 
enforcing such customary norms. In the case of a non-binding instrument, 
these legal arguments admittedly do not have the same force. It would nonethe-
less appear to be only natural, and certainly appropriate, to assume that wide-
spread, generally accepted multilateral standards contained in non-binding 
instruments would presumptively apply in the Bank's lending operations. 
As described in Lyuba Zarsky's contribution, the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Forum (APEC) is an example of an organization whose entire 
existence rests on 'soft' or non-binding instruments. APEC, unlike the OECD 
and the World Bank, has not been established by a binding multilateral agree-
ment. Although instruments such as the 1994 Framework of Principles 
address APEC's states as 'members', one hesitates to use the term 'organiza-
tion', let alone 'international organization', in characterizing such a loosely 
structured arrangement. The most obvious comparison is with the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), which, even in its earlier incarnation as the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, evinced a considerably more 
sophisticated institutional structure than does APEC. In recent years, the 
GA TT/WTO regime has evolved a more formal and rule-based institutional 
structure, while APEC has consciously and purposefully chosen an alterna-
tive, more loosely textured path to trade liberalization and economic integra-
tion. As Ms Zarsky suggests, one consequence of APEC's relatively informal 
institutional structure may well be flexibility and speed, attributes character-
istic more generally of non-binding undertakings. 
Naomi Roht-Arriaza's study of the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) rings a further set of changes on these themes. 
In the case studies of the FATF, the World Bank, and APEC, the entities 
12 See International Agreements on Environment and Natural Resources: Relevance and 
Application in Environmental Assessment (March 1996) (publication of Environment 
Department of World Bank updating Environmental Assessment Sourcebook) (stating that 
'[t]he World Bank, an organization created and governed by public international law, undertakes 
its operations in compliance with applicable public international law principles and rules'). 
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adopting the relevant non-binding standards are subjects of international 
law, vehicles through which sovereign states act collectively to express their 
will. ISO is different; it is not an intergovernmental organization. 13 
Moreover, in the three previous case studies the non-binding norms are 
directed either at states alone or at states and private parties. F ATF's Forty 
Recommendations target both states and private parties. The World Bank's 
policies apply to its own professional staff, with indirect but palpable collat-
eral effects on borrowers. The member states of APEC coordinate policies for 
and among themselves, although certainly with significant effects on private 
transactions and nongovernmental actors. In contrast, ISO voluntary stan-
dards deal solely with the behavior of private parties, generally industry. At 
least as far as the United States is concerned, 14 ISO standards are a somewhat 
curious example of international non-binding instruments adopted by and 
directed to private entities, amounting to a system of voluntary self-regula-
tion by the principal stakeholders. To that extent, ISO presents a fundamen-
tally different setting for private parties from that identified in the APEC case 
study, which concerns attempts by nonstate actors to influence a quintessen-
tially intergovernmental process. 
The municipal legal and policy implications of ISO standards necessarily 
vary from country to country. Some observers have expressed concern that 
countries with poorly developed regulatory infrastructures may eschew 
national regulation, instead adopting wholesale the ISO 14000 series of stan-
dards without regard for the fundamentally process-oriented approach of this 
voluntary instrument. For example, by the express terms of the standard a 
company may be ISO 140001 certified notwithstanding outstanding regula-
tory violations. Even proponents of the new ISO standards admit that they 
are at most complements to, and not substitutes for, performance-based cri-
teria such as emission limitations for air and water pollutants. In the United 
States, federal officials are encouraged to participate in the establishment of 
voluntary consensus standards, including ISO efforts, which then may be 
appropriate candidates for application through binding regulatory require-
13 ISO is an international federation of standardizing bodies from 118 countries and is not an 
intergovernmental organization, typically established by multilateral agreement. whose members 
are states represented by governmental authorities. !SO's work product consists of voluntary 
standards, which are addressed directly to private parties and are not binding under international 
law. 
14 Some countries are represented in ISO by national standardizing bodies that are govern-
mental entities. The United States member of ISO, however, is the American National Standards 
lnstitu~e (ANSI), a private entity. For the United States. the primary, although not sole, partic-
ipants m ISO processes are representatives of private industry. At least for the United States, the 
pn~ate, voluntary character of international standards adopted by ISO mirrors similar under-
takings with respect to standards on the national level. See, e.g., Hamilton, R.W., The Role of 
Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting 
Safety or Health', in Administrmive Conference of' the United Stales. Recommendations and 
Reports (1978) 247, reprinted in (1978) 56 Tex. L. Rev. 1329. 
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ments. 15 But federal agencies may use governmental standards adopted by a 
nongovernmental entity like ISO only as hortatory guidance for agency reg-
ulatory activities, which must be reevaluated by reference to appropriate 
statutory standards. 16 
The relationship of ISO standards to 'hard' international law, as well as to 
domestic law, has recently become complex, in large measure due to the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. As a result of the rela-
tively obvious trade benefits from harmonized standards such as those pro-
mulgated by ISO, the new Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT 
Agreement), expressly references voluntary international standards. The 
TBT agreement establishes that 'standards', as that term is used in that text, 
may include voluntary guidelines adopted by an 'international standardizing 
body', a term which appears intended to include ISO. Although standards 
adopted by ISO are non-binding instruments addressed directly to private 
entities, the TBT agreement then goes on to specify that governmentally 
established requirements or 'technical regulations' shall be based on those 
standards. Governmental regulations that conform to the standards adopted 
by an international standardizing body are presumptively legitimate. 17 Many 
regulatory requirements that have environmental or public health implica-
tions. including specifications for consumer products such as children's toys. 
appliance efficiency criteria, and vehicle fuel efficiency standards, are poten-
tially covered by the Uruguay Round TBT agreement. 
Professor Roht-Arriaza describes the status of ISO standards under the 
TBT Agreement as 'privileged'. It may also be asserted that the TBT 
Agreement 'hardens' ISO standards into binding law, at least under some cir-
cumstances. In the structure of the TBT agreement, those national regulatory 
requirements that are not based on the output of an international standard-
izing body are particularly vulnerable to challenge as unnecessary obstacles 
to international trade. The governmental requirements that are most likely to 
create impediments to international trade are those that are more rigorous 
than the international requirements, which may well be the product of a least-
common-denominator consensus in an industry-dominated forum. The result 
is that, through a trade agreement, the expectations of what, at least from the 
point of view of the United States, is a private standardizing organization are 
15 E.g., National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, § 12(d), Pub. L. No. 
104-113, 110 Stat. 775 (1996); Office of Management and Budget Circular No.A-119, ii 6(a) & 
(b), 58 Fed. Reg. 57,643 (October 26, 1993); 61 Fed. Reg. 68,312 (December 27, 1996) (proposed 
revisions to 0MB Circular A--119). 
16 See, e.g., Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-119, supra note 15, 7(a)(6); 
61 Fed. Reg. 68,312 (December 27, 1996). 
17 An analogous passage in NAFTA sets out a similar approach. North American Free Trade 
Agreement, December 8, 11, 14 and 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex, arts. 905 and 915, reprinted in 32 
l.L.M. 296, 612 (1993) (use of international standards, defined as 'a document, approved by a 
recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics 
... with which compliance is not mandatory'). 
-
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transformed into an outer limit of rigor-a ceiling-for public regulation to pro-
tect health and environment in the United States. Like the vast bulk of inter-
national trade agreements, the Uruguay Round TBT agreement is asymmetric. 
in that it establishes no analogous minimum standards of performance. 
The requirements of the Uruguay Round TBT Agreement and other trade 
agreements initially may appear similar to those in the United States, such as 
0MB Circular A~ 119, which counsel reliance on ISO standards to the extent 
consistent with statutory mandates. In actuality, however, the two cases are 
very different. The 0MB Circular authorizes consistency where possible with 
ISO standards as non-binding advisory guidelines, but it reasserts the pri-
macy of Congressionally-enacted legislative requirements. In a domestic pro-
ceeding for judicial review, a court in principle should apply the statutory test 
without regard to a privately agreed standard in a forum such as ISO. By way 
of contrast, the recent trade agreements establish the private standard as a ref-
erence point and require public authorities to justify departures, especially 
those tending in the direction of more rigorous requirements. This situation 
in effect bootstraps a nongovernmental standard into one with binding sig-
nificance for governmentally-established regulatory requirements, at least as 
a matter of international law. Departures from the benchmark standard can 
then be challenged by foreign governments through the efficacious trade 
agreement dispute settlement process. In other words, operating through the 
TBT agreement, non-binding ISO standards may acquire international legal 
significance, may be transformed from minimum standards of performance 
into regulatory ceilings from which governments must justify departure in 
terms of greater rigor, and, at least from the U.S. point of view, may meta-
morphose from strictly private, non-binding instruments to standards with 
significance under public law. 
The impact within the United States may be considerable. Adverse reports 
of trade agreement dispute settlement panels, like the agreements themselves, 
are binding on the United States as a matter of international law. While those 
same reports are without domestic legal effect and as a formal matter cannot 
alter domestic statutory standards, the reports as a practical matter may have 
significant legal impact in domestic administrative and judicial proceedings. 18 
Moreover, through their implementing legislation, the trade agreements are 
given the effect of binding domestic law and may preempt state law. 
Professor Roht-Arriaza highlights an important issue that pervades the other 
three case studies as well, either expressly or by implication: public participation 
in international processes. An ever-increasing demand for mechanisms respond-
ing to the interests, needs, and inputs of a variety of private parties is character-
istic of many international processes, both 'hard' and 'soft'. In general, one can 
identify at least two critical points in the life of an international 'soft law' instru-
18 See generally Wirth, D.A., 'International Trade Agreements: Vehicles for Regulatory 
Reform?' (\ 997) U. Chi. Legal F. 331, 355- 63. 
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ment at which the public, broadly defined to include all private parties such as 
business and industry, experts such as scientists, the press, public interest orga-
nizations, and individuals, might have an interest: in the formulation of non-
binding expectations on the one hand and in encouraging compliance with and 
implementation of a non-binding instrument on the other. 
While Ms Zarsky notes in the case of APEC that 'both research and advocacy 
NGOs were left standing outside the gate' of intergovernmental consultations 
and deliberations, such a result is not a necessary consequence of the informal, 
non-binding character of APEC. Indeed, there are few generalizations that can 
be made linking the binding or non-binding nature of an international setting to 
the question of transparency and accountability to nonstate actors or the public 
generally. The text of a major, binding multilateral agreement on the protection 
of endangered species entrenched rights of participation for nongovernmental 
organizations more than twenty-five years ago 19 while the formally-established 
WTO, which adopts binding rules, has declined to take analogous steps.20 
In contrast with APEC, the process for adopting ISO standards, as 
described by Professor Roht-Arriaza, is prescribed with exquisite precision 
and is anything but ad hoc. She is more than justified in pointing out that the 
participation of environmental groups and other members of the public, 
though expanding, remains small, at least in United States practice in ISO. 
The practical reality is that few representatives of stakeholders from sectors 
other than business and industry have the resources of time or money to par-
ticipate effectively in ISO processes. The result is that independent voices con-
tribute little to consensus on the national level and, perhaps more 
importantly, have insufficient leverage to impede or frustrate consensus as 
that term is defined in the ISO context. The implementation phase consists 
largely of accrediting certifiers who then certify individual companies to the 
ISO 14001 standard, during which there is little if any opportunity for mean-
ingful public participation.21 
19 Art. XI, para. 7 of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Flora and Fauna. March 3, 1973, art. XI(7), 27 U.S.T. l087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S. 
243, reprinted in (1973) 12 l.L.M. 1035, specifically provides for participation by non-voting 
observers in meetings of the parties to that agreement. 
20 See Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations With Non-Governmental Organizations, 
W.T.O. Dec. No. WT/L/162 (July 18, 1996) (available at website <http://www.wto.org/ngo/ 
guide.htm>) ('As a result of extensive discussions, there is currently a broadly held view that it 
would not be possible for NGOs to be directly involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings. 
Closer consultation and cooperation with NGOs can also be met constructively through appro-
priate processes at the national level where lies primary responsibility for taking into account the 
different elements of public interest which are brought to bear on trade policy-making.'). Cf. 
United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 110 (October 12, 1998), (1999) reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 118 (1999) (avail-
able at website <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm>) (WTO dispute settlement panel 
report concluding that panels have authority to accept unsolicited submissions from nongovern-
mental actors). 
21 Since 1997 the author has served, first, as a representative of environmental group stake-
holders and currently as an at-large member, on the Management Committee for the 
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This theme of untapped potential for public participation echoes through 
the other cases as well. Professor Simmons describes an evolution in the 
involvement of affected business communities in the FA TF's work. The 
World Bank's quasi-adjudicatory Inspection Panel process can be initiated by 
private parties meeting the Bank's eligibility requirements, and is in many 
respects a high water mark for public participation in implementation and 
compliance. Public participation can be expected to increase the perception of 
legitimacy, as well as enhancing efficacy in at least some circumstances.22 
Despite obvious benefits under certain circumstances, the flexibility and ad 
hoc character of many non-binding undertakings do not necessarily facilitate 
participation or direct accountability at either the international or the domestic 
levels. As Ms Zarsky's case study implies, it may well be that the fluidity of an 
institution such as APEC makes it easier to exclude nonstate actors by default, 
without an articulated policy or formal decision, than it might be in a more 
highly structured context such as the WTO. In general there are two principal, 
and far from mutually exclusive, points for nonstate actors in multilateral 
processes, both 'hard' and 'soft' to enter directly into the international consul-
tations, or indirectly, through participating national governments. The efficacy 
of either or both of these approaches may be attenuated because of the non-
binding character of a particular international undertaking. 
In the United States, international agreements that are treaties in the 
Constitutional sense require that the Senate give advice and consent to ratifi-
cation. The process often includes scheduled hearings and other less formal 
consultations with nongovernmental actors, presenting an obvious occasion 
for participation by concerned members of the public. In anticipation of this 
process, the Executive Branch may well find it advantageous to grant those 
constituencies access to the negotiating process in the first instance. In the 
case of non-binding instruments, there often is no notice of governments' 
intent to initiate discussions and the process may not be open to participation 
by nongovernmental observers. On the other hand, the very attribute of infor-
mality that characterizes most, if not all, non-binding international efforts 
may also facilitate the creation of entry points for nonstate actors in a low-
profile manner that would be perhaps somewhat less likely in an established 
intergovernmental organization or in the negotiation of a binding inter-
national agreement. 
Although the implications for compliance with non-binding norms of the 
elements discussed above are not entirely evident, it is nonetheless possible to 
make some general observations. Among the case studies presented in this 
Environmental Management System (EMS) component of National Accreditation Program 
(NAP), a joint undertaking of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the 
Registrar Accreditation Board (RAB). 
22 See generally Wirth, D.A., 'Reexamining Decision-Making Processes in International 
Environmental Law' (1994) 79 Iowa L. Rev. 769. 
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section, APEC probably comes closest to what is customarily regarded as a 
purely non-binding scheme. This impression is particularly strong when 
APEC's structural and institutional attributes are juxtaposed with the 
GATT/WTO regime, whose progress toward a system of enforceable rules 
based on the rule of law has been noteworthy in recent years. By contrast with 
the WTO, undertakings in APEC obviously have a nonbinding, voluntary 
character. Of the four case studies in this section, APEC environmental stan-
dards. which largely represent the agenda of a small number of states and 
clash with other perceived interests of the member states, consequently are set 
in an institutional context in which the impact on actual state behavior would 
be expected to be the least. In addition, the norms are not only soft in form, 
they are soft in content. 
The case study of the World Bank can be elucidated most readily as creat-
ing enforcement mechanisms to implement binding standards. After the cre-
ation of the Inspection Panel, the Bank's internal standards are clearly 
segmented into binding and non-binding categories, with the former 
amenable to enforcement through the Inspection Panel mechanism and the 
latter not. It is probably no coincidence that the 'reformatting' of the Bank's 
internal standards into neatly-defined categories roughly coincided with the 
creation of the Inspection Panel; prior to that development there was consid-
erably less need for this conceptual distinction. While the Inspection Panel 
may have contributed to improving compliance by both Bank staff and bor-
rowing countries with binding internal norms, one could hardly reach that 
conclusion with respect to non-binding instruments, which are not amenable 
to application through the Inspection Panel process. Indeed. the Panel's 
capacity to apply even binding standards exogenous to the Bank is highly cir-
cumscribed. Somewhat perversely, the creation of the Inspection Panel may 
actually reduce compliance with certain standards. When the reformatting 
process was initiated on a systematic basis, a number of observers alleged that 
some of the Bank's standards were purposefully being 'downgraded' to non-
binding status. Whether that is so or not has been difficult to document, but 
the potential for this kind of 'negative feedback' is clear. 
Particularly when viewed against the baseline of the other two analyses, the 
case studies of the F ATF and ISO are perhaps most notable for their poten-
tial, notwithstanding the non-binding format, to encourage performance or 
compliance by third parties whose commitment is reluctant or equivocal. The 
leverage possible and the strong financial incentives behind the F ATF and 
similar efforts to combat money laundering may induce some states to com-
ply that otherwise would not and may stimulate some states to pressure 
others to comply. Although ISO standards are described as adopted by con-
sensus, 'consensus' in ISO is defined not as unanimity, as in most intergov-
ernmental organizations, but supermajority. Once adopted, ISO standards 
are often sufficiently widely implemented that even objectors have little 
.._ 
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realistic choice but to comply. That attribute is the whole point of the 
Organization's existence and the obvious key to the success of its initiatives, 
notwithstanding their nonbinding, extragovernmental character. When 
applied in social policy areas such as environment, the approach can be a 
weakness as well, especially if the distribution of interest group representation 
is perceived as less than adequate and the work product therefore lacking in 
fundamental indicia of legitimacy. 
With the notable exception of the World Bank, one might well observe that 
a hard law form of the norms discussed in this section would not have brought 
greater compliance and certainly would not have been more effective. The 
norms were drafted in non-binding form for strong reasons that make it 
unlikely, or in the case of ISO impossible. to envisage binding obligations in 
their place. The choice appears to have been between non-binding norms and 
no norms, not between non-binding norms and binding ones. Even if a bind-
ing text could have been agreed, it seems probable that the contents of the 
norms would have been weaker than the agreements that were reached. If 
these conclusions are correct, they suggest that legal form does make a dif-
ference, that states take seriously their legal obligations, but that in resolving 
problems of international concern, formal legal obligation is not always the 
most efficacious means to achieve the goals of international cooperation . 
